We find field evidence for what experimental studies have documented regarding the contexts and characteristics that make individuals more susceptible to priming. Just before U.S. Presidential elections, judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals double the rate at which they dissent and vote along partisan lines. Increases are accentuated for judges with less experience and in ideologically polarized environments. During periods of national reconciliation-wartime, for example-judges suppress dissents, again, especially by judges with less experience and in ideologically polarized environments. We show the dissent rate increases gradually from 6% to nearly 12% in the quarter before an election and returns immediately to 6% after the election. That highly experienced professionals making common law precedent can be politically primed raises questions about the perceived impartiality of the judiciary. We cannot rule out the possibility that judges-who profess to be unbiased-are intentionally biased, which also raises the question of intentional bias of professionals who claim to be unbiased.
Introduction
The view of judges as impartial and unbiased decision-makers has been questioned by studies showing that demographic and other background characteristics predict judicial decisionmaking in a range of legal issues (Peresie 2005; Sunstein et al. 2006) . By and large, judges believe there is no evidence for ideological bias (Edwards and Livermore 2008) . They question the interpretation of correlations between judges' decisions and their demographic characteristics such as gender or party of affiliation. Indeed, correlation driven by judges' adherence to different legal philosophies may not constitute per se bias. We test if experienced judges (mean experience = 10.3 y, SD = 7.5) on the U.S. Courts of Appeals are swayed by the partisan nature of elections. If political priming influences the making of common law, it raises questions about the perceived impartiality of the judiciary.
Prior research suggests that priming can increase temporarily the accessibility of knowledge units in the memory of an individual, thus making it more likely that these knowledge units are used in the reception, interpretation and judgment of subsequent external information (Bargh and Chartrand 2000; Storms 1958; Higgins and Chaires 1980) . An activated concept becomes more likely than before to influence conscious judgments. The longest laboratory study documents priming effects one week after the initial stimulus (Tulving et al. 1982) . The greater the concentration of primes or total number of primes, the stronger is the overall priming effect (Srull and Wyer 1979) . However, conscious processing, directed by an individual's intentions and goals, can override the usual or habitual response to priming (Bargh and Chartrand 2000) ; indeed, experienced individuals are less prone to priming, while novices are more easily primed by news coverage (Krosnick and Kinder 1990) . We investigate whether, nearing the U.S. Presidential election, judges become more likely to vote along partisan lines, disagree when sitting with judges appointed by the opposite party, and issue precedent reflecting partisan views.
Materials and Methods
Our data consists of 18,686 judicial rulings, collected over 77 years, by the 12 U.S. Circuit Courts, also known as Courts of Appeals or Federal appellate courts. Each Circuit Court presides over 3-9 states. Our case sample consisted of petitions related to economic activity (50.9%), criminal law (26.9%), civil rights (8.6%), labor relations (7.2%), first amendment, due process, and privacy (2.8%), miscellaneous (2.8%), and unable to be ascertained (0.8%). The 12 U.S. Circuit Courts process all cases that are appealed from the U.S. District Courts.
Circuit judges are appointed for life by the U.S. President. Three judges, out of a pool of 8 to 40 judges in a Circuit, are randomly assigned by a staffing office to each case. For each year we obtained a random sample of roughly 5% of cases. The majority of decisions were unanimous (92%). Our database includes the legal variables that have been hand-coded by prior researchers 1 : variables include litigant type, litigant strategy, how many appellants or respondents were persons, businesses, public interest groups, or government actors, whether there was an issue of constitutionality, whether the court engaged in statutory interpretation, whether the issue involved state or local law, an executive order or administrative regulation, summary judgment, alternative dispute resolution, conflict of laws, international law, or agency discretion. There are over one hundred coded characteristics.
When judges appointed by Democrats and Republicans vote in different ways, the legalist interpretation is that they differ because they simply follow different legal philosophies rather than demonstrating bias. For instance, a judge can derive from first principles an adherence to a strict interpretation of the Constitution, while not necessarily hewing to the preferences of a political party for a certain policy outcome. A variety of professional norms and institutional mechanisms are designed to limit the influence of extrajudicial factors. Federal judges are restricted from any semblance of impropriety. Judges are prohibited from receiving honoraria for speeches, appearances, or articles and are prohibited from receiving compensation for their service to a for-profit or non-profit organization. 2 They are also prohibited from making speeches for political organizations, publicly endorsing or opposing candidates, soliciting funds, making contributions, or attending or purchasing tickets for events sponsored by political organizations or candidates. 3 They are further prohibited from personally participating in any fund-raising activities, soliciting funds for any organization, or using or permitting the use of the prestige of their judicial office for fund-raising purposes. 4 There is no prior evidence that Federal judges are part of Presidential elections or any election (with the unusual exception of Bush v. Gore).
The judges' decisions are classified into two categories, "affirm" and "reverse." On average, 57% of cases were affirmed. The panels' decisions can be 3-0 (unanimous) or 2-1 (dissent). A judge who disagrees with the verdict must write a dissent explaining why. The judges' opinions were also classified into three categories: liberal = 1, conservative = -1, and mixed or unable to code = 0. 5
Results
We find that the likelihood of a dissent is greater in the quarter preceding a Presidential election than after an election or in other quarters over the election cycle. This pattern is evident in Fig. 1 , which graphs the proportion of dissents by quarter-to-election. The graph shows that the likelihood of a dissent spikes in the quarter before the election-the probability of a dissent steadily increases from 6% to nearly 12% and immediately returns back to 6% after the election. To account for the possible role of covariates in the patterns depicted in Fig. 1 , we used a multivariate regression with dissent as the dependent variable and a legal-topic fixed effect to control for the idiosyncratic tendencies for dissent in each legal area, a calendar-quarter fixed effect to control for the tendencies for dissent that change by season, a year fixed effect to control for tendencies for dissent that change over time, Circuit Court fixed effect to control for tendencies for dissent that vary by Circuit, and a divided-panel fixed effect to control for the fact that dissents are more likely when judges appointed by Republicans and by Democrats sit together (Tab. 1).
We use the linear probability model (OLS) as our primary estimation method, and show that our results are robust to the use of probit models. There are two main reasons for this choice. The first is that our objective is to estimate the correlation coefficients rather than to develop a forecasting model of case outcomes, and OLS is superior for estimation purposes. And second, probit is not well-suited to the use of regressions with controls for fixed effects (e.g., dummies for quarter-to-election, legal topic, calendar-quarter, year, Circuit Court, and divided-panel) because of the incidental parameters problemAngrist and Pischke (2008), and our analysis includes many controls for fixed effects.
The key predictors were indicators of a case's temporal position: (i) dummy variables indicating the first three quarters before an election, included to examine how opinions immediately before an election differ from after an election; and (ii) dummies indicating whether Democratic and Republican appointees had been assigned on the same panel. To benchmark the findings, panels with judges appointed by Republicans and Democrats are 1.5 percentage points more likely to have a dissent relative to panels with judges appointed by only one party, but panels in the quarter before an election are 6.4 percentage points more likely to have a dissent relative to after an election. The first three quarters before an election have coefficients that are positively signed and statistically significant, confirming that the pattern in Fig. 1 is robust to controlling for the legal attributes of the case. The results are extremely similar in analyses where we drop one Circuit at a time (Tab. S1). In addition, we rerun our basic specification with each quarter randomly assigned to a different quarter-to-election (a natural bootstrap with 200 draws); the 95% interval for t-statistics is between positive and negative 2.62. Fig. S1 shows that our true t-statistic of 4.01 lies far to the right of all the other simulated t-statistics. Several other simulated t-statistics are close to the true t-statistic, but this is to be expected since the second and third quarter before an election also display significant increases in dissents. Fig. S1 also displays the t-statistics for changes in the quarter before Presidential elections for over one hundred case and litigant characteristics. We find no increase or decrease before Presidential elections along these dimensions. We analyzed another statistical model that simply includes the linear trend that is apparent before elections in Fig. 1 ; regardless of the measure of electoral proximity we used, the trend was negative and significant and the results are nearly identical with probit estimates (Tab. S1).
We can examine whether the increase in dissents is larger for panels with judges appointed by Republicans and Democrats. Fig. 2 reports group means. A large proportion of the increase in dissents comes from ideologically divided panels. For unified panels, the dissent rate is 5.8% increasing to 6.7% before Presidential elections, while for divided panels, the dissent vote rate is 7.3% increasing to 11.7%. 
Figure 2: Judicial Panel Characteris<cs and Electoral Cycles in Dissents
We next analyzed judges' vote ideology, specifically, whether judges appointed by Democrats were more likely to cast a liberal vote and judges appointed by Republicans more likely to cast a conservative vote. Vote ideology measures a behavior different from dissents. For example, if legal precedent dictates a liberal decision, a unified panel appointed by Republicans should cast a liberal vote. Before a Presidential election, however, such a panel may actually cast a conservative vote instead. There would be no dissent observed, but an alignment between the decision and the judges' party of appointment would be observed.
We observe that the ideological difference between Democratic appointees and Republican appointees doubles in magnitude in the quarter before an election (Tab. 2 Panel A). The positive coefficient on the dummy indicator for whether the judge was appointed by a Democrat indicates that Democratic appointees typically cast more liberal votes than Republican appointees. When the outcome measure is coded as liberal vs. not liberal, the interpretation of the regression coefficient is that Democratic appointees are 3.5 percentage points more likely than Republican appointees to cast a liberal vote relative to a neutral or conservative vote, but this difference increases by another 3.9 percentage points before the election.
Decisions issued by unified panels (with three Republican or three Democratic appointees) are also more likely to reach partisan conclusions before Presidential elections. Panels with three Democratic appointees are 7.5 percentage points more likely to issue a liberal verdict than panels with three Republican appointees (Tab. 2 Panel B). Because case types should be evenly distributed across panel composition and across the electoral cycle, one might expect no increase in the correlation between the panel's party of appointment and the case outcome before elections. Precedent dictating a liberal outcome should be just as likely to appear before Democratic appointee panels as Republican appointee panels. In the quarter before a Presidential election, however, differences between panels with three Republican or three Democratic appointees double. It is important to note that, while these effects may seem large relative to the benchmark, only a small portion of vote ideology is explained by these political factors (Col. 1), indicating that the vast majority of factors driving dissents by judges remains unexplained. Fig. 3 plots the partial correlation between party of appointment and vote ideology for each quarter before an election. Before the election, the partial correlation is a little over 0.15, which is roughly twice the average partial correlation. This means that the ideological effect is similar whether comparing to the quarter after an election or comparing to all other quarters. Changing the vote ideology of unified panels is one way for judges' decisions to impact development of law, but the direct impact on the District Court decision is another. Since District Court judges are also politically appointed, we may expect, on average, that Circuit and District Court judges disagree more before elections and for this to be reflected in an increase in reversals and decrease in affirmations of the lower court decisions. We find that Circuit Courts are 5.9 percentage points less likely to affirm and 5.2 percentage points more likely to reverse the District Courts in the quarter before an election relative to after (Tab. 3).
(1)
( We now turn to the role of experience to further investigate whether the characteristics that make individuals more susceptible to priming in the lab are found in the field. Experimental research has found that inexperience magnifies priming effects (Krosnick and Kinder 1990) . Tab. 4 re-estimates our basic specification for sub-samples of judges grouped by the number of years they have served as Circuit judges. Overall, judges are 1.7 percentage points more likely to cast a dissenting vote before a Presidential election (Row 1). For judges with 1 or 2 years of experience, the magnitude of this effect is a considerably larger 3.4 percentage points. The point estimates are positive and sometimes statistically significant for other experience groups, e.g., 7-8 years of experience. The fact that inexperienced judges are more likely to dissent before a Presidential election is consistent with judges taking awhile to develop the strong professional, conscious commitments that would otherwise control the influence of unconscious bias (Rachlinski et al. 2009 Notes: Robust OLS standard errors clustered at the quarter-year in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01). The explanatory variable of interest is a dummy variable indicating whether the case was decided in the quarter immediately preceding a presidential election. Numbers in Column 3 do not sum up to the sample size in the first row as some cases have judges with years of experience outside the displayed range.
If elections prime partisan identities, what about wartime, which can prime national identity? Fig. 4 shows that dissents decrease during wars, whose official dates are indicated by the This result is robust to regression controls (Tab. 5). Notably, the decrease in dissent rates during wartime is largely attributed to divided panels (Col. 1) and inexperience (Col. 2). 7 The coefficient on the non-interacted term, war, is insignificant, while the coefficients on the interaction terms are large and negative. Since 70% of panels are divided, the average effect of wartime is also negative. Moreover, divided panels, which are usually 2 percentage points more likely to dissent than unified panels, are 0.6 percentage points less likely to dissent during war. In sum, judges who are less experienced and sitting on divided panels are both more likely to dissent before Presidential elections and more likely to not dissent during wartime.
(1) During wartime judges are also more likely to affirm and less likely to reverse lower court decisions (Col. 3-4) and these effects are statistically significant at the 1% level.
A key aspect for interpreting the association between the temporal position of a case and decisions is whether an unobserved factor determines case order in such a way that yields the pattern of results we obtain. For instance, if cases involving contentious issues were somehow more likely to appear before an election, we would naturally find a greater proportion of dissents occurring before the election as well. Two procedural factors preclude this possibility.
First and most critically, the cases are randomly assigned. Thus, the judge cannot decide to take contentious cases before an election. Second, displacing controversial cases to a later time can not explain the wartime results; wars can last for several years, and court guidelines limit the ability to delay cases for that long.
Discussion
When U.S. Courts of Appeals judges make decisions before Presidential elections, they are more likely to vote in a partisan manner. Experience mitigates this tendency, which is consistent with prior research suggesting that experience can override the usual or habitual response to priming (Krosnick and Kinder 1990; Bargh and Chartrand 2000) .
These results contribute to a set of findings on behavioral judging. When judges and de-fendants match on first initials, the sentence length is 8% longer (two to three months) (Chen and Prescott 2016) . The U.S. Supreme Court is 7 percentage points more likely to vote for a male petitioner whose voice is above-median in masculinity (Chen et al. 2016d,c) . Refugee asylum judges are 2 percentage points more likely to deny asylum to refugees if their previous decision granted asylum (Chen et al. 2016b) . Likewise, asylum judges are roughly 2 percentage points more likely to grant asylum on the day after a home-city Sunday football game win instead of a loss (Chen and Spamann 2014) . Further, the explanatory power of these factors persist after employing the best prediction models of asylum and sentencing decisions (Barry et al. 2016; Chen and Eagel 2016; Chen et al. 2016a ).
This paper does not aim to establish causal connections. A companion paper by one of the authors shows the same pattern, at the monthly level, for the universe of 293,868 cases coded for dissents from 1950 to 2007 . U.S. Courts of Appeals judges elevate their dissents for ten months prior to Presidential elections. Dissents are elevated in swing states and in states that count heavily to winning the election, when these states are competitive. U.S. Senate elections further elevate dissents. Dissents occur shortly before publication, increase with monthly increases in campaign ads, and appear for cases whose legal topic, economic activity, is most heavily covered by campaign ads. Dissents before elections appear on more marginal cases that cite discretionary miscellaneous issues and procedural (rather than substantive) arguments, which the Supreme Court appears to recognize and only partly remedy.
These findings raise more general questions about the political partisanship of the judiciary and, more generally, the primeability of highly trained professionals with strong commitments to be unbiased. We cannot rule out the possibility that highly trained professionals-who profess to be unbiased-are intentionally biased, which would raise questions about the intentional bias of other professionals that society has come to expect to be unbiased. Table S1 : Electoral Cycles in Dissents -Additional Robustness Checks Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the quarter-year level in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01). The explanatory variables of interest is a dummy variable indicating whether it is the last quarter before an election (Column 3) or a continuous variable for quarters to election (Columns 1-2). Marginal effect from a probit specification of dissent on continuous variable for quarters to election in Column 2.
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Each coefficient represents a separate OLS regression.
